Case Brief: State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Bhola @ Bhairon Prasad Raghuvanshi

Deciding Authority: Supreme Court of India
Date of Judgement: 6th February, 2003
Bench: S. Rajendra Babu, D. M. Dharmadhikari & G. P. Mathur.
Facts of the Case: This appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh against the judgment dated 16.1.2001 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 3603 of 1999. By placing reliance on two Judges Bench decision of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Sadhu Saran Shukla [1994 (2) SCC 445] the High Court has held that Rule 3 (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Prisoner’s Release on Probation Rules, 1964 is ultra vires Section 2 of Madhya Pradesh Prisoner’s Release on Probation Act 1954 [hereinafter referred to as ’the Rules’ and ’the Act’ respectively]. The two-Judges Bench of this Court in the case Sadhu Saran (Supra) declared similar Rule 3 (a) of U.P. Prisoners’ Release on Probation Rules as ultra vires Section 9 and Section 2 of the U.P. Prisoners’ Release on Probation Act, 1938A legal question of general importance on the validity of Rule 3(a) of the Rules is before us for consideration. The respondent/prisoner is not represented by counsel. On our request, Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Advocate had agreed to assist this Court and to project the possible view in favour of the prisoner.
The appellant/State of M.P. is represented by Sr. Advocate, Shri R.P. Gupta who took us through the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules and almost similar provisions of U.P. Act and the Rules. On completion of more than five years sentence of imprisonment, the respondent/prisoner made an application for his release on probation in accordance with Section 2 of the Act read with the Rules. His application for release on probation under the M.P. Act and Rules was not considered by the State because by Rule 3(a) convicts for offences specifies under Section 396 of Indian Penal Code cannot seek release on probation under the Act. The prisoner approached the High Court in the Writ Petition. By placing reliance on the decision of Sadhu Saran (supra) the Writ Petition was allowed by the impugned order and directions wereissued to the State government to consider the application of the prisoner for release on merits in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules.
Judgement of the Case: The two-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. (Supra) has confirmed the judgment of the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court only on the limited finding that Rule 3(a) of U.P. Rules is in excess of the rule making authority because and the rule goes contrary to the ambit of section 2 of the Act. In the concluding part of its judgment, the two-Judges Bench observes that it would be open to the State Legislature to make the impugned rule 3 (a) as part of the Act itself. The above observation necessary leads to an inference that the Bench was also of the opinion that the contents of the rule could have formed the part of the main Act. The only vice found in the rule was that it was in excess of the rule making authority. A delegated legislation can be declared invalid by the Court mainly on two grounds firstly that it violates any provision of the Constitution and secondly it is violative of the enabling Act. If the delegate which has been given a rule making authority exceeds its authority and makes any provision inconsistent with the Act and thus overwrides it, it can be held to be a case of violating the provisions of the enabling Act but where the enabling Act itself permits ancillary and subsidiary functions of the legislature to be performed by a delegate – the delegated legislation cannot be held to be in violation of the enabling Act. In the instant case, the legislative policy of release of prisoners on probation after considering their antecedents and conduct in the prison, is laid down in the provision of Section 2 read with the preamble and other provisions of the Act. It was not possible for the legislature at the time of enactment of the statute to envisage and encompass in its provisions all penal laws and punishments leading to incarnation of the offenders.
The subject of classifying the offenders based on their antecedents and conduct and offences for which they have been convicted, has to be left to the executive authority to determine and specify from time to time by rules and amendments made to it if and when found necessary. Such delegation of power by the legislature to the executive cannot be held to be either in violation of any constitutional provision or in excess of the rule making provision of the Act. We are not prepared to accept the reasoning of the High Court of Allahabad that the rule gives a blanket power to the executive to lay down specified class of offenders in relation to the offences for which they are convicted and put them outside the purview of the Act. Rule 9(4) which enables froming of rules to classify the offenders impliedly permits their classification not merely on the basis of their antecedents and their conduct in the prison but also on the basis of the offence for which they have been convicted and imprisoned. We fail to understand why such classification of offenders in relation to the nature of offences committed by them is impermissible for a limited application of the Act which aims at reforming a specified and identified classes of prisoners whose release would not be hazardous to society and who show possibilities of turning out to be good citizens if given liberty under strict supervision of specified institutions, authorities or individuals.